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An Alternative Constitutional Implementation Mechanism? A Case Study of Kenya’s 





 In the last several decades, the common experience for many new states was the 
promulgation of a constitution that facially embraced the core values of liberal democracy, but was 
followed by total failure in bringing provisions and the spirits of the constitution into reality. This 
shows the difficulty of constitution making and the importance of constitution implementation in 
modern times for young and struggling democracies.  
 This Paper analyzes the independent implementation commission of Kenya and its work 
in facilitating the implementation process of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, and further evaluates 
the effectiveness of such implementation mechanism. The case study of the Kenyan Constitution 
implementation shows that an independent implementation commission established by the 
constitution can have substantially positive impact over the implementation process. To design a 
successful commission, it is crucial to ensure its institutional independence, legal and enforcement 
power, and collaboration with civil society. 
I. THE CHALLENGES OF CONSTITUTION IMPLEMENTATION 
Without effective implementation, the constitution remains merely “a piece of ‘printed 
futility.’”1 A major failure of constitution-making in modern times is the failure of implementing 
the constitution 2  and making the constitution a living document as it is in fully developed 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020, Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in 
Economics and International Studies, 2017, Emory University. 
1 Charles M. Fombad, Problematising the Issue of Constitutional Implementation in Africa, in THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 10 (Charles M. Fombad ed., 
2016). 
2 Charles M. Fombad, Introduction, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES 
AND PROSPECTS 1, 3 (Charles M. Fombad ed., 2016). 
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democracies. The failure of constitution implementation is an especially acute problem in post-
independence states that adopt constitutions incorporating liberal democracy principles but do not 
have a long history of embracing democratic values in their societies. This is because they are 
mostly likely to face a number of common challenges in the process of constitution implementation. 
First, the constitution implementation process is more likely to be compromised in young, 
post-independence democracies as the culture of constitutionalism is largely absent from such 
societies. The culture of constitutionalism tends to safeguard the implementation of the 
constitution since it emphasizes the integrity of the constitution and subsequently promotes a 
general respect to the constitution in all levels from a society. It prompts the government to be 
bound by limitations prescribed by the constitution and provides grounds for the people to compel 
government to act within its constitutional boundaries.3  
This commitment to constitutionalism had the opportunity and time to be developed and 
embodied in Western states, but it is much less developed in post-colonial states, even if 
comprehensive and democratic constitutions are adopted in those states. Especially in today’s 
young democracies, it is a vastly shared experience that the “post-independence constitutionalism 
is generally nipped in bud by leaders” who consistently ignore their constitutional obligations.4 
Without the protection of constitutionalism, the constitution itself will hold little influence and is 
much more vulnerable to illegal political manipulation. 
 Second, social elites in young and struggling democracies often have strong self-interests 
in maintaining their social status and “us[ing] constitutionalism and democracy as a smokescreen” 
to disguise their real intentions to perpetuate their power and personal gain. 5  For them, 
 
3 Charles M. Fombad, Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on Some Current 
Challenges and Future Prospects, 59 BUFFALO L. REV. 1007, 1014 (2011). 
4 Fombad, supra note 2, at 2. 
5 Fombad, supra note 1, at 22. 
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constitutional reforms are not sought so much for the actual “reform” of the constitution but rather 
for the “legitimized” access to political power.6 A common phenomenon in post-colonial Africa 
consists of social elites using the constitution as a mere political instrument to concentrate power 
in their own hands, with no regard for constitutionalism principles. Imagine a constitution 
promulgated as the result of social elites’ compromise under popular pressure and thus containing 
provisions embracing constitutionalism principles. If such a constitution is fully implemented, it 
would substantially curtail not only the power held by the elites but also any further possibility of 
regaining such power. Social elites would have a particularly strong incentive to neglect or even 
obstruct the implementation of that constitution. 
Third, a constitution is not a self-implementing instrument, and constitutions are usually 
silent about their own implementation mechanisms. The absence of any formal institution 
responsible for the constitution implementation process leads to undervaluation of the importance 
of implementation processes after a constitution is promulgated. Consequently, the level of public 
scrutiny of the implementation process is lowered. To ensure implementation of the constitution, 
public oversight and “an active and vibrant citizenry” is required.7 This is especially true for states 
that lack the culture of constitutionalism and have a class of elites incentivized to jeopardize the 
implementation process. Public oversight and vigilance are particularly important because of the 
additional accountability provided in this crucial stage of constitution implementation.  
II. CASE STUDY OF THE KENYAN COMMISSION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Kenya’s Commission for Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) provides a good 
example of an honorable effort in confronting the challenges of constitution implementation in a 
 
6 See, e.g., Charles Mutasa, Introduction: Revisiting Civil Society and Constitution Making in Africa, in CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN AFRICA 12 (Tyanai Masiya & Charles Mutasa eds., 2014); H. Kwasi 
Prempeh, Africa’s ‘Constitutionalism Revival’: False Start or New Dawn?, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 469, 501 (2007). 
7 Id. at 5 
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young and struggling democracy that lacks a deep root of constitutionalism and has a class of 
social elites averse to liberal democracy and constitutionalism. The creation of an implementation 
commission is a rather novel idea in the realm of constitution implementation. The essential idea 
of the CIC was to delegate an independent commission to oversee and facilitate the overall 
constitution implementation process of the new 2010 Kenyan Constitution. This case study 
examines the structure and functions of the CIC on the page versus the CIC in practice, as well as 
its achievements and obstacles. Despite a few defects, the CIC made a great contribution to the 
constitution implementation process of Kenya. 
A. Overview of Kenya’s Constitution Making History 
Kenya had a bumpy journey in constitution making and democratization. The undisputable 
fact about this nation, as Professor Lumumba pointed out, was “the elusiveness of attaining a viable 
constitutional dispensation.”8 The British Colonial Government of Kenya, in order to smoothly 
implement constitutional change, created a new middle class through education, land, and agrarian 
reforms, resulting in the middle class joining the mainstream settler economy and the government.9 
These new African elites who acquired control of land and economic infrastructure had little 
incentive to dispense political power to the rest of the population. 10  As a consequence, the 
Independence Constitution lacked popular support and a foundation for the sprout of democratic 
constitutionalism.11 
From the time of Kenya’s independence in 1963 until 1989, Parliament amended the 
Constitution twenty-four times.12 These piecemeal amendments were motivated by ruling elites’ 
 
8 P.L.O. Lumumba, A Journey Through Time in Search of a New Constitution, in The Constitution of Kenya: 
Contemporary Readings 1, 13 (M.K. Mbondenyi et al. eds., 2011). 
9 CHARLES O. OYAYA & NANA K. POKU, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA: A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 
AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 71 (2018). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 89. 
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selfish desire to secure their political and economic benefits13 and had the effect of concentrating 
power in the national government and the executive branch. 14  The constant violation of 
constitutional norms by these amendments had negative impact on the sanctity of the constitution 
and obstructed any possible consolidation of the culture of constitutionalism in the society.15 
Kenya’s struggle for democratic constitutional reform began in 1989. President Moi agreed 
to repeal the constitutional provision of single-party rule and opened the political platform for 
multiparty elections in 1992, under pressure from former elites who were excluded from the 
mainstream politics, the international community, and the wave of democratization elsewhere in 
Africa.16 Though the new multiparty system introduced some political competition, the people 
demanded deeper constitutional reforms.17  
Old elites, namely the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) government that ruled 
Kenya since its independence, wanted minimal reforms that did not compromise their hold on 
power. New elites and opposition politicians wanted reforms necessary to remove KANU from 
the seat of power, but were not seeking the structural constitutional reforms demanded by the 
people.18 As a result, both the old and the new political elites pretended to agree to the reforms that 
were popular, but often viewed the democratic constitutional reform process as a threat to their 
power and consequently abandoned the reform process numerous times.19  
On the other hand, the idea of constitutional reform gained massive support from the people 
and civil society in Kenya. Between 1997 and 2001, the Constitution of Kenya Review Act set out 
 
13 Id. 
14 FRANCES MCEVOY, AN EVALUATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION IN KENYA 2, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/35cb/bc21073388f3003b440a6d7d7d841f1024be.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2019). 
15 OYAYA & POKU, supra note 9, at 89. 
16 CHRISTINA MURRAY, POLITICAL ELITES AND THE PEOPLE: KENYA’S DECADE LONG CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
PROCESS 1 (2018) (available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3147154). 
17 Id. 
18 MAKAU MUTUA, KENYA’S QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY: TAMING LEVIATHAN 118 (2008). 
19 OYAYA & POKU, supra note 9, at 106. 
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the legislative framework for the constitutional reform process20 and turned the review process in 
to “an ambitious and idealistic three-stage process which was to be ‘people driven.’”21 The Review 
Act of 2001 authorized the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), in consultation 
with the people, to draft bills to reform the constitution and submit the draft to the National 
Constitutional Conference (NCC)22 for revision and approval.23 Once approved, the NCC would 
submit the draft to Parliament to adopt and the President to sign.24 The CKRC included civil 
society members, which allowed significant public participation in the constitutional reform 
process.25 
However, after the 2002 election in which a political opposition coalition terminated the 
KANU’s decades-long political domination, the new government and the new elites abandoned 
their enthusiasm for further constitutional reform once they gained the power that they long 
sought.26 Not long after, a series of changes were enacted that severely endangered the established 
constitutional reform process.27 A backsliding constitution referendum28 was introduced in 2005 
that stimulated campaigns from both proponents and opponents of the referendum. 29  The 
campaigns deepened the existing political disagreement about the constitutional reform among the 
 
20 Id. at 114. 
21 MURRAY, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
22 The NCC is a huge institution that included politicians from the national level (all Parliament members) to local 
level (representatives from administrative districts) as well as from registered political parties; it also included 
representatives from various civil society groups and NGOs. Id. at 2–3. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 2. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 3. 
27 The Review Act was amended to allow the Parliament to make changes to the reform draft with a simple majority; 
a Kenyan Hight Court case decided that the Constitution could only be replaced with a referendum, raising the 
difficulty of the proposed replacement of some constitutional provisions; a later decision suspended all NCC works 
and effectively suspended the process generating reform drafts. Id. at 4. 
28 Unlike the prior NCC proposal, the 2005 referendum sought to concentrate power to the executive branch (once 
again) and to concentrate power to the national level (rather than to disperse power in a multilevel system 
government). Id. 
29 Id. at 4–5. 
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politicians and elites. The polarized social tension erupted into unprecedented violence 
immediately after the allegedly rigged and flawed 2007 election.30 
The mediation effort led by international actors resulted in a power sharing agreement and 
a new Constitution of Kenya Review Act in 2008; the new constitutional reform process that 
secured the elite consensus and invited public participation finally produced the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution.31  
The new Constitution generally receives widespread recognition and is viewed as a 
progressive and successful reform compared to the efforts made before. It ensures a bicameral 
system of parliament (Senate and National Assembly), the principle of separation of powers, and 
an independent judiciary.32 It also emphasized the devolution of government by creating a two-tier 
system of government composed of the national and the county levels. Furthermore, it addresses 
ethnically divisive politics, provides a fair system for resource and power sharing among different 
ethnic groups and between the central and county governments, and promotes accountability and 
public participation.33 
The new Constitution pays particular attention to its implementation and values the 
implementation process as a matter necessary to be addressed in the constitution itself. Such 
special attention to constitution implementation is demonstrated by creation of the CIC by Kenya’s 
2010 Constitution. Mandated by the constitution in Section 5 of the Sixth Schedule, the CIC was 
charged with duties of monitoring, overseeing, and facilitating the implementation of the new 
Constitution.34 It is designed to serve as an independent implementation mechanism to ensure the 
 
30 Id. at 6; see also MUTUA, supra note 18, at 246–47. 
31 MURRAY, supra note 16, at 7, 11–12. 
32 Jane Serwanga, The Use of Specialised Commissions for Constitutional Implementation: An Outsider View of the 
Kenyan CIC, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 197, 
199 (Charles M. Fombad ed., 2016). 
33 Id. 
34 CONSTITUTION art. 262, § 5 (2010) (Kenya). 
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principles and provisions of the new Constitution to be realized, after two decades of struggle in 
constitutional reforms.35 
B. The Organization of the CIC 
1. Structure and Membership 
i. Structure 
The CIC consisted of one Chairperson and eight members, as required by the Constitution36 
and the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution Act,37 and at least five members, 
including the Chairperson, were required to serve on a full-time basis. 38  The chairperson 
supervised and directed all the work of the CIC and served as the spokesperson of the CIC.39 The 
CIC adopted a “thematic approach,” which identified eight separate subject matters of the 
Constitution implementation and delegated each subject matter to each one of the eight 
Commissioners and their offices.40 
The CIC was allowed to hire staff to better exercise its functions, including researchers, 
experts, or consultants to provide the CIC with necessary knowledge and skills.41 It devised a 
secretariat, including a chief executive officer and two directorates, for general administration 




35 COMM’N FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, END TERM REPORT § 1.2.1 (Dec. 2015) [hereinafter 
END TERM REPORT]. 
36 CONSTITUTION art. 262, § 5(2) (2010) (Kenya). 
37 The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution Act (2012) Cap. 9 § 6 (Kenya) [hereinafter CIC Act]. 
38 Id. § 5(2). 
39 Id. § 9(3). 
40 END TERM REPORT, supra note 35, § 1.2.5. 
41 CIC Act, supra note 37, § 15. 
42 END TERM REPORT, supra note 35, § 1.2.5. 
 9 
ii. Eligibility requirements 
The Constitution provides that the members of the CIC should include “persons with 
experience in public administration, human rights, and government.”43 Section 7 of the CIC Act 
further specified that the candidates for both the Chairperson and members would be eligible if the 
person (a) is a citizen of Kenya, (b) holds a degree from a recognized university, and (c) has 
knowledge, experience, and a distinguished career of at least five years in fields such as law, public 
administration, economics, human rights, and government.44  
Furthermore, in order to be eligible, the Chairperson must be qualified to hold a position 
as a judge of the Supreme Court under the Constitution.45 This means that the Chairperson was 
required to have at least fifteen years of experience in the field of law as a judge, judicial officer, 
or legal practitioner.46 Additionally, the disqualification clause in the CIC Act provides that if a 
person is a state officer or a member of a local authority, or if the person is bankrupt, the person 
would not be qualified to serve on the CIC.47 A state officer is any person holding a state office, 
and it includes people who work under the executive and legislative branch, such as the attorney 
general and members of the Parliament.48  
The constitutional and statutory eligibility requirements of CIC membership helped build 
the CIC as a group of experts with strong backgrounds in multiple areas. The diverse expertise 
provided the CIC with leadership that possessed solid legal experience and knowledge. The 
disqualification clause that forbid government employees was essential for the maintenance of 
 
43 CONSTITUTION art. 5(3)(a) of sched. 6 (2010) (Kenya). 
44 CIC Act, supra note 37, § 7(1). 
45 Id. § 7(2). 
46 CONSTITUTION art. 166(3) (2010) (Kenya). 
47 CIC Act, supra note 37, § 7(3). 
48 CONSTITUTION art. 260 (2010) (Kenya). 
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independence of the CIC and helped to combat executive and legislative influence over members 
of the CIC. 
iii. Appointment Process and the Final Composite of the CIC 
Sections 8 and 9 of the CIC Act set out the appointment process of the Chairperson and 
members. First, applications for CIC membership were forwarded to the Public Service 
Commission and the names of all applicants were to be published in the Gazette. Applications 
could be made by any qualified person or by any person, organization, or group proposing a 
qualified person. Next, the Public Service Commission convened a committee consisting of 
representatives of the Cabinet, Prime Minister, Ministry of Justice, State Law Office, Ministry of 
State for Public Service, and Public Service Commission. The Committee considered the 
applicants and picked at least three people qualified for the Chairperson and eighteen people 
qualified for the members. The committee subsequently submitted the lists to the President and 
the Prime Minister, who, in consultation with each other, nominated one Chairperson and eight 
members of the CIC and forwarded the names to the National Assembly. The National Assembly 
could then either approve or reject the nominations. If a nominee was rejected by the National 
Assembly, the President and the Prime Minister would submit a new nomination from the list 
provided by the Committee. A person was appointed upon receiving approval from the National 
Assembly. 
The Commissioners took oath of the office on January 4, 2011 and commenced their work 
immediately after.49 The members of the CIC were selected to form a body with diverse expertise 
and broad social representation.50 The Chairperson, Charles Nyachae, was a practicing lawyer and 
 
49 END TERM REPORT, supra note 35, at 1.2.3. 
50 Serwanga, supra note 32, at 202. 
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the son of renowned former cabinet minister.51 He possessed substantial experience in human 
rights and electoral laws and was also perceived at the time as an apolitical figure who “had a firm 
grasp of the substantive legal issues and provided intellectual leadership.” 52  After the CIC 
dissolved, he was nominated and appointed as a judge of the East African Court of Justice and 
sworn in the seat in early 2018.53 The rest of the CIC body was equally impressive and consisted 
of lawyers, law and science professors, scholars, analyst experts, arbitrators, civil society 
consultants, and commissioners of various independent commissions; overall, the body had vast 
expertise in constitutional law, human rights, conflict resolution, public policy, civil society, 
environment, administration, and institutional development.54  
2. Life Span  
The Constitution provides that the CIC would be dissolved five years after its establishment 
or “at the full implementation of this Constitution as determined by Parliament, whichever is 
sooner.”55 If at the end of five-year deadline Parliament decided that the Constitution was not fully 
implemented, the National Assembly could extend the life of the CIC through resolution.56 
 The CIC term was set to expire on December 29, 2015. The CIC itself did not seek 
extension of its term because, as Mr. Nyachae explained, the decision had to be made by 




53 Kamau Muthoni, Nyachae Lands Job as East African Court Judge After Missing EALA Appointment, THE 
STANDARD (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001270915/nyachae-sworn-in-as-judge-of-
east-african-court.  
54 For a full biography of the Commissioners of the CIC, see 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121208042318/http://www.cickenya.org/index.php/about-us/staff  
55 CONSTITUTION art. 262, § 5(7) (2010) (Kenya). 
56 Id. 
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the implementation process in order to keep their jobs by advocating for an extension.57 In early 
December 2015, the Senate approved a two-year extension of the CIC term.58 The Senate took this 
position because several bills mandated by the Constitution had not yet been passed, but the 
National Assembly took the contrary position and opposed an extension of CIC’s term.59 Through 
a Parliament select committee called the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee 
(CIOC), Parliament recommended disbanding of the CIC and that the Attorney General (AG) 
should take over the unfinished tasks of the CIC.60 Jane Serwanga, a renowned Kenyan legal 
advocate with specializations in human rights and gender justice, commented that “[i]n view of 
the tense relationship between the CIC and the executive, particularly the AG, one cannot help but 
see political machinations behind this decision.”61 Ultimately, the term was not extended and the 
CIC is now defunct. 
3. Financing 
Article 249, Section 3 of the Constitution provides the “Parliament shall allocate adequate 
funds to enable [the CIC]62 to perform its functions.”63 The CIC Act also allows the CIC to accept 
money from other sources such as donations or loans.64 The CIC had significant trouble securing 
adequate funding from the government. The CIOC initially estimated that the government needed 
to allocate about 4 billion Kenyan shillings for the whole implementation process, while the CIC 
 
57 Reselyne Obala, We will not seek extension of our mandate, says Commission for the Implementation of the 
Constitution Chairman, STANDARD DIGITAL (Sept. 16, 2014), 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000135093/we-will-not-seek-extension-of-our-mandate-says-cic-
chairman.  
58 Roselyne Obala, Senate Approves CIC Term Extension, STANDARD DIGITAL (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000184434/senate-approves-cic-term-extension. 
59 Id. 
60 Serwanga, supra note 32, at 213. 
61 Id. 
62 CONSTITUTION art. 262, § 5(4) (2010) (Kenya). 
63 Id. art. 249. 
64 CIC Act, supra note 37, § 21. 
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estimated 3.6 billion shillings for the first two years of its work.65 As the work began, an even 
smaller amount of budget was allocated. 66  In addition, the government delayed paying the 
Commissioners’ salaries until months after their work commenced and took a long time to approve 
the CIC budget proposals for hiring staff.67 
In addition to the frustrations explained above, the CIC faced threats of budget cuts from 
Parliament when tensions arose between the two, so the CIC also relied on financial aid from 
development partners.68 For example, the CIC partnered with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and received funds from countries including Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Japan. 69  The USAID also provided 2.5 million U.S. dollars to assist the constitution 
implementation process in Kenya and to fund the CIC’s operation.70 
4. Supervision of the CIC  
The CIC was designed as an independent commission that was only answerable to “the 
Constitution and the law” and was “not subject to direction or control by any person or authority.”71 
Accordingly, the CIC planned its agenda and took actions on its own initiative according to the 
Constitution’s requirements. However, the accounts and finance of the CIC was required to be 
 
65 Kamotho Waiganjo, The Use of Specialised Commissions for Constitutional Implementation: An Insider View of 
the Kenyan CIC, in IMPLEMENTATION OF MODERN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 177, 
187 (Charles M. Fombad ed., 2016). See also Oliver Mathenge, Taxpayers Face New Sh4b Bill for Constitution, 
DAILY NATION (Oct 19, 2010), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Taxpayers-face-new-Sh4bn-bill-for-
constitution/1056-1035580-2phh3x/index.html. 
66 Waiganjo, supra note 65, at 187. 
67 Gakuu Mathenge, Nyachae-Led Team Yet to Be Paid Salaries, STANDARD DIGITAL (July 3, 2011), 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000038274/nyachae-led-team-yet-to-be-paid-salaries?pageNo=2. 
68 Serwanga, supra note 32, at 202. 
69 Maria-Threase Keating, Remarks at the UNDP Launch of the 2014/2015 Annual Report of the Commission for 
the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) (Aug. 17, 2015) (transcript available at 
http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2015/launch-of-the-2014-2015-annual-report-
of-the-commission-for-the-.html.). 
70 SUPPORTING THE KENYAN CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS, USAID, 
https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1860/supporting-kenyan-constitutional-implementation-processmarch-2013 (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
71 CONSTITUTION art. 262 & art. 249(2) (2010) (Kenya). 
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audited and submitted for the Auditor General’s review after each fiscal year.72 Furthermore, if a 
member was suspected of gross misconduct, violated the Constitution or any other law, or became 
incapable of carrying out his or her duties as a Commissioner, the National Assembly was 
authorized to submit a petition to the President, and the President could call for a tribunal 
(composed of at least one judge and two persons who are qualified to be appointed as judges) to 
investigate the matter, report its findings, and make recommendation for the next step, which the 
President must follow.73 
C. The Functions and Duties of the CIC 
Schedule Six of the Constitution provides that the basic functions of the CIC are to74  
a. monitor, facilitate and oversee the development of legislation and 
administrative procedures required to implement this Constitution; 
b. co-ordinate with the Attorney-General and the Kenya Law Reform Commission 
in preparing, for tabling in Parliament, the legislation required to implement 
this Constitution; 
c. report regularly to the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee on  
i. progress in the implementation of this Constitution; and 
ii. any impediments to its implementation;  
d. work with each constitutional commission to ensure that the letter and spirit of 
this Constitution is respected. 
According to the Constitution, the roles of CIC may be put into three general categories: 
monitoring and overseeing the implementation process, facilitating the implementation process, 
and reporting the implementation progress to the CIOC. 
Before each function of the CIC is examined, it is important to note that the implementation 
of the Constitution has two major facets: timing of legislation and substance of legislation. First, 
the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution sets out deadlines of each piece of legislation to be enacted 
 
72 CIC Act, supra note 37, § 24. 
73 CONSTITUTION art. 251 (2010) (Kenya); CIC Act, supra note 37, § 11. 
74 Id. art. 262. 
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by Parliament, and full implementation of the Constitution entails compliance with the deadlines 
established by the Constitution.75 Second, full implementation of the Constitution also entails that 
enacted legislation embodies the correctly interpreted principles and spirit of the Constitution, and 
no legislation is enacted in violation of the Constitution 76  These two parts of Constitution 
implementation were the two main themes of the CIC’s work and functions.  
1. Monitoring and Oversight Function 
The monitoring and oversight function began with inquires made by the CIC to relevant 
stakeholders about a certain constitutional mandate.77 The CIC then analyzed and evaluated the 
implementation progress based on the given information. 78  Upon its conclusion about the 
implementation progress, CIC then exercised its functions of facilitation, if necessary, and its duty 
of reporting. 
2. Implementation Facilitating Function 
CIC facilitated implementation according to both substantive requirement and deadlines 
set by Schedule Five of the Constitution. First, the CIC paid special attention on whether 
legislations were enacted on time as mandated by the Constitution.79 Second, according to its 
mandate in the Constitution, the CIC also exercised its facilitation function through reviewing the 
substance of drafted bills and ensuring that the bills complied with the Constitution both during 
and after the legislation process. If the CIC believed any drafted or enacted legislation or any part 
of a (drafted or enacted) legislation was not compliant with the Constitution, it would try to the 
legislation in track with the Constitution through the exercise of the powers described below. 
 
75 Id. art. 251. 
76 Id. 
77 See Serwanga, supra note 32, at 203. 
78 Id. 
79 END TERM REPORT, supra note 35, § 1.2.4 
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3. Reporting Duty 
The CIC’s reporting duty is further defined in the CIC Act enacted in 2010. Section 25 of 
the Act provides that CIC shall report quarterly to the CIOC, the President, and the Prime Minister, 
and the report should include information on (1) the progress of the Constitution implementation, 
(2) any impediments to the Constitution implementation, and (3) legal and administrative 
recommendations to address CIC’s concerns.80 CIC also has the duty to present annual reports to 
the President and Parliament about the financial status of the CIC, activities of the CIC, and the 
like.81 Furthermore, for both quarterly and annually reports, the CIC should also make sure that 
the reports are published in the Gazette and thereby accessible by the public.82  
D. Competence of the CIC and Measures Adopted by the CIC in Fulfillment of its Functions 
In general, Section 25 of the CIC Act provided that the CIC was entitled to “all powers 
generally necessary for the execution of its functions under the Constitution and [the CIC] Act,”83 
but this vague provision is often unclear regarding what powers the CIC possessed and what 
measures the CIC could use to fulfill its duties of monitoring and facilitating the implementation 
process. Thus, more specific powers and tools of the CIC were used in practice and are described 
below. 
1. Review Proposed Legislation and Prepare Tabling Before the Parliament 
As the Constitution required, the CIC and the AG, in consultation with each other, prepared 
bills for tabling before Parliament. 84  The CIC consulted the AG and reviewed bills for 
constitutionality and timing compliance under the authority of the Constitution. The CIC’s role of 
 
80 CIC Act at § 25 
81 Id. at § 26. 
82 Id. at §§ 25(3), 26(4). 
83 Id. at § 5(1). 
84 CONSTITUTION art. 261(4)(ii) & art. 6(b) of sched. 6 (2010) (Kenya). 
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reviewing proposed laws can be better understood in the context of the law-making process of 
Kenya under the new Constitution. First, once a bill is drafted, it is presented to the Attorney 
General’s 85 office and the Kenya Law Reform Commission (KLRC),86 who, after revising the 
draft, would forward the draft to the CIC. Then, the CIC would evaluate the draft and consult with 
multiple stakeholders, including the AG and the KLRC, about whether the bill is compliant with 
the Constitution and, if not, what changes are necessary to make the bill constitutional. Once the 
discussion reaches an agreement among the stakeholders, the CIC would forward the bill to the 
AG for a final drafting. 
In the next step, the AG would present the bill to the Cabinet for approval or suggestion of 
revision. Once approved, the bill would be published by the AG and tabled for parliamentary 
debate. The CIC would prepare an advisory note to Parliament if the bill contained provisions that 
were not compliant with the Constitution. The advisories would include the clauses that the CIC 
viewed as unconstitutional and provided explanations of why the discussed clauses should be 
deleted or revised.87 Finally, after passing the parliamentary debate, the bill would be presented to 
the President for his or her assent for passage.88 
2. Monitor and Assess the Implementation of Enacted Legislations 
After a legislation is enacted, the CIC monitored the implementation progress of the law 
by making inquiries to relevant public officials. For example, after the Transition to Devolved 
Government Act was enacted in 2012, the CIC exercised its monitoring function by assessing how 
 
85 The AG is the principal legal advisor and counsel of the Government and is appointed by the President with 
approval of the National Assembly. CONSTITUTION art. 156 (Kenya) (2010). 
86 The KLRC is a commission that facilitates law reforms in Kenya and ensures proposed laws are properly 
compliant with the spirit of the Constitution. Mandate and Core Functions, KENYA LAW REFORM COMM’N, 
http://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/about-klrc/mandate-and-methods-of-work. (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
87 See CIC Advisory on Parliamentary Powers and Privilege Bill, CIC, 
https://www.scribd.com/document/238611970/CIC-Advisory-on-Parliamentary-Powers-Privileges-Bill. 
88 See Serwanga, supra note 32, at 204. 
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well the decentralized government system was implemented in county governments (the second 
tier government and one part of the devolved government) for the period from March 2013 to 
March 2014.89 The CIC drafted and administered questionnaires to governments officials such as 
the county secretaries, county assembly clerks, and secretaries to the county public service board, 
successfully targeting all forty-seven Kenyan counties.90 The CIC then analyzed the collected 
information from these questionnaires and composed the Assessment of the Implementation of the 
System of Devolved Government, which explained the challenges in the implementation process 
and made recommendations in all aspects of the implementation of government devolution.91 
The CIC Act imposed “a duty to cooperate” on public officers, state organs, and state 
offices to make sure that these stakeholders responded to inquiries from CIC and reported to CIC 
about implementation status with respect to the inquiries.92 Public officers who violate the CIC 
Act, especially the duty to cooperate, would be deemed “in contempt of Parliament” and could be 
convicted with punishment of fine or imprisonment up to one year, or both.93 The duty to cooperate 
was an important statutory requirement that safeguarded the monitoring and overseeing function 
of the CIC. In order to gain detailed information necessary to evaluate the implementation progress 
and the constitutionality of each proposed bill, it was crucial for the public officers and state 
organizations to respond to and fully address inquiries from the CIC. The negative consequence 
and liability imposed on violators also deterred noncompliance of the government and its agents 
when the CIC performed its monitoring function.  
 
 




92 CIC Act, supra note 37, § 27(1). 
93 Id. § 27(2). 
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3. Judicial Intervention 
When the CIC perceived that a passed law, policy, or administrative procedure was 
unconstitutional, the CIC sought judicial intervention. The CIC had petitioned lawsuits (usually 
against the Attorney General and the Parliament), submitted amicus curiae briefs, and joined cases 
as an interested party. For example, the CIC initiated legal actions challenging the constitutionality 
of the National Assembly’s Standing Order No. 66 in 2015,94 and in 2013, the CIC joined as 
interested party in the judicial procedure that decided the unconstitutionality of the Constituency 
Development Fund due to its violation of multiple constitutional principles.95 
4. Stakeholder and Civil Society Engagement 
The CIC organized and held stakeholder engagement activities, such as consultative 
meetings, forums, workshops, and seminars, to advise public officials (who are also the 
implementors of the Constitution) on the implementation requirements for various pieces of 
legislation.96 For example, the CIC held the Consultative Forum on Access to Justice in Nairobi in 
June 2013.97 Additionally, the CIC participated in conferences, workshops, and retreats, and gave 
presentations to stakeholders. The CIC also invited civil society groups of different areas to discuss 
the implementation process and to solicit additional knowledge in areas including judicial reforms, 
transition to a more devolved government system, and property rights. 98 When the CIC reviewed 
 
94 Implementation of the Constitution v. Speaker of the National Assembly (2016) Petition 403 of 2015 (H.C.K.). 
Other examples of legal actions initiated by the CIC: Petition 145 of 2011, Petition 268 & 398 of 2012, Petition 454 
of 2012, etc. 
95 Waiganjo, supra note 65, at 188. See also The Institute for Social Accountability & Anor v. The National 
Assembly & 2 others (2015) Petition No. 71 of 2013 (H.C.K.). 
96 END TERM REPORT, supra note 35, § 1.2.4.  
97 CIC, Quarterly Progress Report April to June 2013, KENYA GAZETTE, Vol.CXVI-No.94, 2006 (available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MTA2Mg--/Vol.CXVI-
No.94/#GAZETTE%20NOTICE%20NO.%205506). 
98 Serwanga, supra note 32, at 206. 
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proposed legislation, it carried out consultations with representatives from civil society, religious 
organizations, and nongovernmental actors to discuss the bills. 
5. Public Engagement  
The CIC maintained an interactive website during its service and shared information about 
its work and constitutional implementation in Kenya. It published drafts of proposed laws once 
the CIC received them from the AG and the KLRC and invited the public to comment on these 
drafts.99  Its website also provided a bill tracker which reported the status of the passing of 
legislation and published CIC’s implementation assessments reports in specific areas of 
constitution implementation and CIC’s periodical reports on implementation activities in general.  
In addition, the CIC issued statements and advisory opinions and conducted media 
briefings to the public to express its concerns and positions about various constitutional or 
constitutional implementation issues and to call on different actors for support.100 The Chairperson 
appeared frequently in the news to voice CIC’s criticism of the government with respect to 
implementation of the Constitution. 
E. The Achievements of the CIC 
The most important achievement of the CIC is that it was successful in actually 
implementing the Schedule Five on mandated legislations in the Constitution. At the end the fifth 
year of CIC, except for a few laws that were delayed till after the CCI became defunct, almost all 
of the legislation mandated by the Constitution had been enacted within the within the time limit. 
The CIC also facilitated the creation of some institutions that are essential for the constitution 
 
99 CIC, Audit Report on the Acts Enacted by Parliament (Aug. 26, 2011), https://devolutionhub.or.ke/resource/audit-
report-on-the-acts-enacted-by-parliament. 
100 CIC, Annual Report 2011/12, KENYA GAZETTE, Vol. CXV-No. 73 (May 10, 2013), 2655 (available at: 
http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/NzU4/Vol.%20CXV-No.%2073/ ). 
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implementation, including the National Police Service Commission, the National Land 
Commission, and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. 101  The result that it 
delivered—the actual implementation of the new Constitution—is the most basic and critical 
building block for the establishment of constitutionalism in Kenya. Furthermore, the CIC’s effort 
in encouraging and creating avenues for public engagement on constitutional issues also 
contributed to increasing public awareness of such issues as well as the accumulation of a culture 
of constitutionalism.  
The CIC was also successful in placing an effective check and creating accountability on 
the government and political elites therein by participating independently in the legislation process, 
initiating judicial interventions to challenge unconstitutional laws when necessary, and publicly 
criticizing the government when it or its members acted solely based on its own interest. The CIC 
played the role as a fearless watchdog of the Constitution and protected the integrity of the 
Constitution against any potential threat of constitution encroachment from the political elites.  
Finally, the creation and success of the CIC revealed the importance of constitution 
implementation process in young democracies and a clear advantage of having an independent 
entity for the implementation process of a newly promulgated constitution, especially in countries 
that do not have a deep root of constitutionalism and are subject to elite manipulation of the 
constitution. The Kenya CIC is successful in certain aspects of its institutional design and serves 
generally as a good example for other constitution implementation commissions that share the 




101 Waiganjo, supra note 65, at 188. 
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1. Constitutional Mandate 
The CIC is mandated by the Kenyan Constitution, the most fundamental law of the country. 
The Constitution’s mandate of CIC places much more assurance of the creation and durability the 
CIC during its term than if the CIC is mandated by a bill of Parliament. The CIC’s constitutional 
mandate also provides the CIC with more prestige, which contributes to its power of persuasion in 
front of the government, the court, and the public.  
2. Independence 
The CIC was given a special status that makes it directly subject to the Constitution and 
only answerable to the Constitution. This strengthens the independence of the CIC by eliminating 
any direct political control from any of the three branches of the government. If the CIC was 
subject to and managed by the government, there would be a great risk of manipulation from the 
government on the agenda, operation, and even standpoints of the CIC. 
The membership requirements of the CIC contributed to its independence as well. The 
disqualification clause that precludes all serving public officers to apply for the commissioner 
positions helped to cut off relation and dependency between the CIC and the government. The 
Chairperson is also held up to the same qualification as appointees to the Supreme Court judges, 
subject to an even higher independence standard.  
The member selection process involved wide range of stakeholders and was collaborated 
(and checked) by multiple levels of both the executive branch and the legislative branch. This 
minimized the risk of staffing the CIC with “favored” persons or even political puppets of any 




F. The Challenges Faced by the CIC 
The process of implementation of a new reformist constitution is not an easy one and 
always invites the dangers of “political manipulation, political sabotage, or political frustration of 
the process for personal, partisan, sectarian, and selfish gains.”102 In the context of Kenya, the CIC 
noted that the implementation process had suffered from challenges including103  
Selective reading and misinterpretation of provisions of the Constitution by 
implementing agencies, deliberate misinformation to members of the public by 
some members of both the Executive and the Legislature, a lack of guidance from 
the Office of the Attorney-General in the process of implementation of the 
Constitution, political risk, and the increasing trend by the Executive and some 
members of the Legislature to create grey areas regarding the interpretation of the 
of the Constitution. 
 
This Paper examines a few of the most important challenges faced by the CIC. 
1. Independence 
The CIC was established as an independent commission free from any undue influence 
from the government, and the general structure of the CIC ensured its independency during the 
five-year term. However, both the Constitution and the CIC Act are not clear about the budget of 
the CIC and therefore leave the Parliament an opportunity to control of the funding of the CIC. As 
a result, the CIC received both insufficient and delayed funding from the Parliament. The Members 
of the Parliament had threatened to cut down the budget allocation and the number of 
commissioners served in independent commissions, as a “revenge mission” understood by the 
CIC. 104  Possible design responses to strengthen the independence of an Implementation 
Commission will be discussed in the next section of this Paper. 
 
102 Ben Sihanya, Constitution Implementation in Kenya, 2010-2015: Challenges and Prospects, FES Kenya 
Occasional Paper, No. 5, 2011, at 1, 22. 
103 Id. at 23. 




2. Life Span 
The CIC was only given five years of lifespan initially, and the extension of its term was 
subject to the will of the Parliament. This gave the Parliament the power to dissolve the CIC simply 
by declaring the completion of CIC’s work. Considering that there were still several bills that did 
not make the constitutional deadlines, it seems that the Constitution underestimated the time 
required to pass the bills as well as potential obstacles that could delay bills. Therefore, the 
constitutionally mandated lifespan of the CIC could have been a few years longer than five years 
so that the CIC could remain independent from Parliament’s will and safeguard the bills that 
needed to be passed under the Constitution.  
3. Collaboration with the AG 
The CIC’s working relation with AG was not very smooth through implementation period. 
First, ambiguity in the language of mandates of the CIC caused some discrepancies in AG’s and 
CIC’s understanding the functions and powers of the CIC. The Constitution requires the CIC to 
work “in consultation” with the AG and KLRC but does not provide further specification, and this 
inadequacy caused problems to the work of CIC.105 The AG interpreted the word “consultation” 
as follows: 
What does consultation mean? We get the draft from the parent ministry, do the 
drafting, we share the draft with the CIC and tell them to quickly give their 
comments on it, and send the law back to us. If they make comments that we find 
inappropriate we will not agree with them.106 
 
This understanding of “consultation” gave the AG ostensible ground to ignore CIC’s opinions with 
which the AG did not agree. 
 
105 Serwanga, supra note 32, at 203. 
106 Id. (citing Jason Lakin, Rhetoric: What Githu Muigai, Omar Hassan can learn from JM Kariuki, EAST AFRICAN 
(Jan. 15, 2012), https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/What-to-learn-from-JM-Kariuki-/434750-1306074-
vkmqex/index.html). 
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Second, the CIC often criticized the AG for delay in presenting bills to the Cabinet and 
Parliament and alleged that the AG even forwarded some bills to the Cabinet and Parliament 
without the consultation process with the CIC, as the Constitution mandated.107 The AG’s lack of 
compliance of the consultation process was identified as a major challenge faced by the CIC in 
many of CIC’s quarter and annual reports.108  
It is similarly challenging to find a perfect resolution for the problem of AG’s bypassing 
the CIC. The CIC directed most of the arguments with the AG to the CIOC for settlement, but 
some of the disputes were never resolved.109 The best cure for this problem might not lie in the 
institutional design of the implementation commission. The CIC, through its Chairperson’s media 
exposure and its periodic reports, had publicly condemned the AG for bypassing the CIC in some 
occasions, and, although the effect of such criticism on the AG might be too elusive to evaluate, it 
is not hard to imagine that such criticism did at least make some difference. On the other hand, if 
the draft’s bypassing of the Commission was unconstitutional, the Commission could initiate legal 
action to challenge the constitutionality of the legislation after its enactment. Thus, the 
Commission is not depleted with its tools in safeguarding the implementation process just because 
the AG bypasses the commission in draft review from time to time. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE CIC: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR FUTURE INSTITUTION DESIGN 
The journey of the CIC in Kenya serves as an inspiration for the implementation of other 
later newly reformed or established constitutions. Through the CIC experience, there are a few 
elements can be identified to contribute to the success of an implementation commission. 
 
107 Sihanya, supra note 95, at 28. 
108 CIC, Annual Report 2012-2013, KENYA GAZETTE, Vol.CXVI-No.103, (Aug. 29, 2014), § 4.1(ii) of Chapter Four 
(available at: http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/notice/165140). 
109 Waiganjo, supra note 65, at 190. 
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A. Constitutional Mandate 
Having a constitutional mandate of the implementation commission is crucial to the 
success of the commission. The constitution can safeguard at least the birth of such a commission 
and increases the probability of institutional durability due to its higher resistance against careless 
or hostile amendments.110 Additionally, it highlights the importance of the implementation process 
as well as of the role of such a commission, so the commission’s work and opinions are respected 
and weighted in the law-making process by both the government and other stakeholders. 
B. A Complete Scheme that Guarantees the Independence of the Commission 
Having a detailed constitutional mandate of the commission with emphasis on its 
independence will help to minimize political pressure over the commission. The independence of 
such commission in general can be better achieved by paying close attention to all elements 
contributing to its independence and eliminating possible influence at each element in the mandate 
of the commission.  
First, the commission needs to be only answerable to the constitution, and no other political 
organ can directly or indirectly interfere with its work. This requires the constitution to be clear 
and precise about the commission’s independent identity and to confer upon the commission a 
right to bring legal action (such as an injunction) against a party (such as the attorney general) 
when such party intrudes upon the operation of the commission. 
Second, like the CIC, the implementation commission should hire only non-government 
officials to ensure that the commissioners are independent and nonpartisan. This can reduce the 
 
110 Charles M. Fombad, Designing Institutions and Mechanisms for the Implementation and Enforcement of the 
Constitution: Changing Perspectives in Africa, 25 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 66, 85 (2017). 
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risk that the work or ideas promoted by the commissioners is contaminated by their possible 
political self-interests. 
Third, the constitution should give a specific demand on the budget funding of the 
implementation commission, such as a minimum amount of annual allowance and/or a method of 
allowance calculation. Since the commission itself is usually most familiar with its own activities 
and the amount of funds needed, the budget proposal by the commission should be account for in 
the calculation of the final decision by the legislature and can only be denied by compelling reasons, 
whose validity should be subject to the determination of a tribunal (which can be either an existing 
court in the judicial system or a temporary tribunal called by the commission and composed of 
serving judges).  
Fourth, in case of any possible delay, which is quite likely to happen in any constitution 
implementation process, it would be better to set the initial lifespan of the implementation 
commission longer than the anticipated time of the full implementation. But the commission 
cannot keep operating and being unable to be shut down if by any chance all the implementation 
work is finished on time. One solution to this problem is placing an additional strict rule so that as 
long as the implementation process is ongoing, the implementation commission cannot be 
disbanded. If this solution causes too much concerns in budgeting of the parliament, the 
constitution can alternatively set a fixed dismissal time that is a few (two or three) years later than 
the supposed completion time of the constitution implementation and give the parliament the 
authority to dismiss the commission at a point before the fixed dismissal time but after the 




C. Some Enforcement Power 
A successful implementation commission needs at least some real political and legal 
powers to carry out its functions. Ability to seek judicial interventions gave the CIC the power and 
option to present its opinions in the courts, but this is not the most efficient way to prevent an 
attorney general from bypassing the implementation commission in preparation of tabling before 
the parliament. In the event of disagreement over the constitutionality of a bill, it would be harder 
for the government to ignore an implementation commission’s opinion or bypass the commission 
altogether, if the mandate of that commission were to specify more duties of compliance on the 
side of the government.  
One way to promote government compliance can be done by replacing ambiguous phrases 
like “in consultation with” with more stringent ones like “upon reaching consensus/mutual 
understanding with.” Such a phrase indicates that much more communication and collaboration 
are required on the part of the attorney general before it can pass a draft forward and that it would 
be a more serious violation of the constitutional mandate if the attorney general chooses to bypass 
the commission. A change like this, however, grants the implementation commission, a small 
group of people who are not directly accountable to the people, a veto-like power over a bill that 
might be supported by the democratically elected representatives in parliament. Thus, this solution 
could have a hard time passing the counter-majoritarian difficulty of the implementation 
commission. 
Another way to promote government compliance is allowing the implementation 
commission to seek judicial intervention during the bill-reviewing process. The commission can 
be allowed to ask the court for an injunction commanding the attorney general to withdraw the bill 
submission from the parliament whenever it fails to consult with the commission. However, this 
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option can potentially cause overflowing of litigation since the number of bills mandated by the 
constitution is usually massive, as does the number of potential violations of legislative procedure. 
This can also substantially increase the commission’s spending due to these lawsuits and place an 
even heavier burden over the budget problem of the commission. An alternative option is to permit 
the commission to apply for court orders nullifying bills that are enacted by the parliament without 
proper constitutionally mandated draft-review procedure. This option provides a similar deterrence 
effect on the attorney general, and significantly decreases potential caseloads to the courts and the 
commission since number of bills passed by the legislature is much smaller than number of bills 
presented to the legislature. This type of legal action is different from other lawsuits initiated by 
the commission contesting constitutionality of legislations because here the commission only 
needs to establish the unconstitutional bill-review process instead of the unconstitutional substance 
of the legislation. Granting the commission some legal power in this regard strengthens its ability 
in enforcement. It also effectively increases the government’s cost of noncompliance and thus 
provides the government more incentive to comply. 
D. Collaboration with Civil Society 
Many of the achievements of the CIC relied on the support of other actors such as other 
independent commissions and offices, civil society, and foreign partners. Implementation 
commissions, like the CIC, will naturally tend to seek collaboration and partnership with other 
organizations because such commission is so small that it is impossible to comprehend every 
aspect of a constitution without the expertise from those who specialize in certain areas. The CIC 
maintained great relationships with these entities and benefited tremendously from these working 
relationships, but at the same time, it also shows the importance of having a robust civil society 
and/or independent commission system in the implementation process.  
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To further enhance the connection between the commission and civil society, the mandate 
of the implementation commission can include civil society experience as one way to qualify a 
candidate for the commissioner position and require that at least one commissioner have extensive 
experience either within civil society or collaborating with civil society. This can help build a 
strong bond between the people in the commission and the civil society. 
The institutional design of an implementation commission can also benefit from 
incorporating some of the CIC’s practices into its mandate: the commission should be designed to 
include civil society in the bill reviewing process by listing all civil societies, categorizing them 
by their concerning areas (such as human rights or devolution of government), and inviting the 
ones of the area that related to the bill to the draft consultation meetings. The meeting can be 
mandatory for each time a bill is forwarded to the implementation commission, or it can be 
required to be arranged only for those fundamental or important legislations and leave the 
discretion of deciding what are the fundamental or importance bills to the commission because it 
might face time or budget constraints for hosting the meetings. The commission should also serve 
as a liaison between the law makers and civil society and assume a responsibility of summarizing 
and relaying the opinions from the civil society to the attorney general and the legislature during 
the commission’s consultation with these stakeholders.  
CONCLUSION 
 The implementation process is difficult to accomplish but is certainly crucial to the success 
of a new constitution, especially in a young, struggling democracy. The case of Kenya’s CIC is 
generally a persuasive story of how a Constitution-mandated, independent implementation 
commission is of particular usage to the implementation process. Despite some defects, the CIC 
did manage to achieve the implementation of most constitutionally mandated legislation and 
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ensured constitutionality of most of the enacted legislation. The experience of the CIC shows that 
a similar constitution implementation can have positive impact in the building of culture of 
constitutionalism and in combating against elites’ self-interests in the process of constitution 
implementation. 
The experience of the CIC also shed some light on how to craft a successful implementation 
commission in countries like Kenya. In general, the success of such commission could be better 
obtained by having detailed Constitution provisions that assign (1) independence of the 
commission in terms of membership and funding; (2) a longer lifespan than the anticipated 
implementation period; and (3) some political powers to the commission and duties to comply to 
the government.  
